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THE INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY ON LAW
AND POLITICS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION*
GRAY L. DORSEYt
In Western civilization, philosophy has had an influence upon the
norms of law and politics and upon attitudes toward legal and political
questions and problems. The basic influence, as might be expected,
occurred early in the course of Western civilization. It produced a
central tradition of natural law and humanism that has had setbacks
and various interpretations, but has continued to serve as the guide
for law and politics in the Western countries except for the Commu-
nists, and for a time, the Germans., However, one of the characteristic
attitudes has no present justification, is dangerous, and needs to be
changed.
I. THE INFLUENCE UPON NORMS
In the last century of the Roman Republic and continuing into the
Empire, a social revolution of first magnitude occurred. C. H. Mc-
Ilwain has said of this change in Roman life, "There is probably no
other social revolution in recorded history so important, so complete,
so continuous over so long a period...." 2 Mellwain noted the trans-
formation in every branch of Roman private law: property, marriage,
testamentary succession, contracts, etc. These are the working-to-
* Text and summary of resulting discussion of a paper presented by Professor
Dorsey at the Third East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of
Hawaii, Honolulu, June 22 to July 31, 1959. The purpose of the Conference was,
"To consider the practical implications of comparative philosophy for cultural
institutions as a basis for world understanding and co-operation." The Law
Quarterly wishes to thank The University of Hawaii Press, which will publish a
book containing the full proceedings, for permission to publish this part of the
proceedings of the Conference.
t Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis.
1. Troeltsch, The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity in World Politics, in
Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society (Barker transl. 1950).
2. McIlwain, Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern 54 (1940).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
gether and living-together relations of a society, and are political in
the sense that they constitute the way in which the polis is organized
for action. Why should such a complete change occur? We shall look
first at the life and ideas of the earlier period and then at the life and
ideas of the later period, and see if the reason for the change does not
appear.
Life in the early city-state of Rome (and in the early Greek city-
states) is best seen through the pages of Fustel de Coulanges' The
Ancient City.3 Fustel, with what is today generally recognized as re-
markable insight, stressed the importance of religion in the life of the
family and of the city-state. The head of the family, paterfamilias,
had the sole right to carry on the family religion. It was his responsi-
bility to see that the sacred fire on the hearth was never extinguished,
or profaned by the presence of strangers. This fire was the constant
symbol of the living soul of the original paterfamilias surviving in his
descendants, partaking of the "immortality of generation."' The pater-
familias was also the lawgiver and judge, the economic manager, the
leader in war.5 When cities were formed by amalgamation of gens and
tribes of families, it was thought necessary to establish a hearth and a
sacred fire for the city6 Indeed, community was only possible on the
basis of community of worship. Gods were local and exclusive. 7 Rights
and duties existed only between those who had the same gods. Each
family was autonomous until it joined with others in a gens, tribe or
city, which then shared a common worship.8 In the face of threatened
destruction Athens could not extend her defensive league beyond the
cities linked by common worship in the amphictyony of Delos.9 The
normal state of relations between the cities of Greece was war, and
community of worship was the basis of such cooperation as they
achieved. o
The significance for our purposes of these facts about life in the
early Roman and Greek city-states will become apparent when an im-
plicit premise is stated and compared with one resulting from Greek
natural philosophy. The latter premise would be, "The universe is
rational." The earlier, implied premise was, "The universe is whimsi-
cal." Events were not related by cause and effect. Events occurred, or
did not occur, at the whim of the appropriate god. We speak of the
3. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City (7th ed. Small transl. 1889).
4. 2 Plato, Laws, in Dialogues 492 (Jowett transl. 1937).
5. 3 Westrup, Introduction to Early Roman Law 148 (1939).
6. Nilsson, Greek Piety 6 (Rose transl. 1948).
7. Fustel, op. cit. supra note 3, at 162-63; Greenidge, A Handbook of Greek
Constitutional History 6-7 (1896); Nilsson, op. cit. supra note 6, at 10.
8. 3 Westrup, op. cit. supra note 5, at 143.
9. Greenidge, op. cit, supra note 7, at 48-51, 202.
0. Id. at 46, 60.
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mythical gods of ancient Greece and Rome. But they were not mythical
then. They controlled events. In such a world the only way to plan
ahead was to consult the gods. The only wise men were those who
could consult the gods-and these were the heads of families, gens,
tribes and city-states who had responsibility for the religion of the
groups they headed.
It was common sense that authority should belong to the paterfa-
milias, or his counterparts in the city-state. Therefore, they were the
judges, economic managers, and war leaders. It would be foolish to
have decisions made by anyone else. Rostovtzeff has said, "The public
life of Rome was inseparable from religion: every action of the state
began and ended in a religious ceremony .... The imperium or execu-
tive power of the magistrate was closely connected with his exclusive
right of ascertaining the will of the gods by auspices, of soliciting, in
the name of the community, their protection, and lastly of propitiating
them .",,
The Stoic philosophers were the first to formulate the full implica-
tions of a rational universe for law and politics. Plato and Aristotle
had believed that only the best men could know the rational order in
the universe, and that other men were by nature fit only for lesser jobs
than knowing the good and planning community affairs wisely. The
Stoics taught in their physics that the universe is ruled by absolute
rational law and that the essential nature of man is reason. 2 The im-
plication of this was that all men are rational creatures. And when
the Stoics in their ethics taught men to "live according to nature,"
they were building acceptance for their idea of a single Cosmopolis in
which all men are equal because reason makes them equally able to
know what justice requires in every relation of life and intercourse.
Stoicism began to be taught in Rome a little less than a century be-
for the fall of the Republic." Ehrlich, one of the great students of
Roman legal history, has said that the main root of the Roman law is
the juristic law, and he claimed credit for having shown in his Bei-
trge zur Theorie der Rechtsquellen that the Roman jurists created
their law independently, and not by interpretation of the earlier stat-
utes and edicts.' About thirty years after Stoicism was first taught in
Rome, the first of the great Roman jurists, Q. Mucius Scaevola (a
Stoic), wrote the eighteen volumes on civil law which earned him rec-
ognition as the founder of Roman law. 5 Of fourteen jurists whom
11. 2 Rostovtzeff, A History of the Ancient World 53-54 (Duff transl. 1927).
12. Stace, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy 349 (1934).
13. Arnold, Roman Stoicism chs. 12-15 (1911).
14. Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 260-61 (Moll
transl. 1936).
15. Sohm, Institutes of Roman Law 90-91 (Ledlie transl. 1907).
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Jolowicz lists as laying the foundation for and developing Roman
juristic science during the Republic, at least eleven can be found by
perusal of Arnold's Roman Stoicism to have been Stoics.10
The Greek philosophers destroyed the world of whimsy. They pos-
ited a world of reason, and their evidence was so convincing that the
gods who controlled events gradually faded from reality to myth. With
them went community consensus in support of centering authority in
men who hadt charge of the religious auspices. The resulting changes
can be traced in Roman private law as cIlwain suggested.17
In the early city-states all property belonged to the family-con-
ceived of as the continuity of generations, not as a community of living
persons. The current paterfamilias could not alienate family property.
He could not disinherit the son. The son could not refuse an inheri-
tance that was a net liability. In fact the paterfamilias possessed and
passed on, not the property itself, but only the authority to act with
respect to the property. Daughters, who could never become the fam-
ily head, could not inherit. With the influx of Greek thought, the idea
of legal personality was divorced from religious authority. Family
heads could alienate some of the family property. Sons could hold
property and make contracts in their own right during their father's
lifetime. Daughters could inherit. Sons could be disinherited, or could
refuse an inheritance.18 In short, the control by the succession of
paterfamilii over all property from which members of the family de-
rived benefit was completely broken through. The control of the
paterfamilias over the persons of family members and even slaves was
restricted. 9 Thus, it can be seen that the change in the content of the
norms of the Roman polis was very great.
The change in the structure of norms was also great. The subjects
of rights and duties are no longer men as understood in a common
sense way, but conceptual entities defined within the hierarchically
ordered body of norms covering all human relationships. Roman law
had been a series of legal rules, such as one finds in the Code of Ham-
murabi. Suddenly it had the logical structure that caused Cuq to say
"the Romans have fixed for all times the categories of juristic
thought."20 This logical structure first appeared in the treatise of the
Stoic, Q. Mucius Scaevola, referred to above. Sohm has said that
Scaevola "was the first to determine, in clear outline, the nature of
legal institutions (will, legacy, guardianship, partnership, sale, hiring,
16. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 90-91 (1932).
17. Mcllwain, op. cit. supra note 2.
18. Sohm, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 177-78, 186-93, 449-50, 482-88, 501-05.
19. Id. at 165-84.
20. 1 Cug, Les Institutions Juridiques des Romains xxiv (1904).
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&c.), and their various kinds (genera)." 1 For the first time there
was a juristic science. Sohm succinctly states the significance of such
a science:
A scientific exposition, for example, would never run as follows:
If a thing has been delivered to you under a contract of sale, you
have a right to keep it, and a third party into whose posession it
comes is bound to hand it over to you. [This is the kind of lan-
guage you will find in Hammurabi's Code.] The scientific exposi-
tion would be in this fashion. First, ownership is a right, un-
limited in its contents, to exercise control over a thing. Thus we
get the conception of ownership. Secondly, ownership can be ac-
quired by traditio, occupatio, usucapio, &c. (each of these terms
being defined). Thus in place of a series of legal rules we have a
number of abstract conceptions .... 2
The change with respect to the source of norms was equally great.
With respect to private transactions, the change was from ritualistic
formulas to formless juristic acts. With respect to public law-gov-
ernment-it was a change from the authority of those in charge of the
auspices to the authority of the people. In private transactions the
actual articles, such as cattle or grain (or symbols representing them),
had been passed from hand to hand as the appropriate ritual was re-
citeed. If the ritual was faulty in any small detail the transaction was
not accomplished. With the change in Roman law, concepts rather
than physical articles were manipulated. The modelm transaction of
mortgage replaced a physical exchange of land and money for a period
of years. Ritual was replaced by the intent of the parties. Not the will
of the gods, invoked through ritual, but the will of rational men in a
rational world, was decisive as to whether the transaction was com-
pleted. -
The changes outlined above were some of the practical consequences
of an idea that provided a basis for community beyond the community
of worship. All men could enter into reciprocal rights and duties and
receive justice with respect to their relationships because justice did
not lie with any man's gods, but was in the hands of professional
jurists sworn to uphold the impersonal, universal law before which all
men were equal. Men did not deal with one another quaz men, but
transactions were carried out between "seller" and "purchaser,"
"pledgor" and "pledgee," "mortagor" and "mortgagee," etc., all of
whom had definite, specific rights and duties set down in the heirarch-
ically ordered body of legal norms.
Not only could the community become larger, but also it could be-
come much more complex. Since man as a legal person was not com-
21. Sohm, op. cit. supra note 15, at 91.
22. Id. at 32-33.
23. Id. at 69.
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mon sense man, but legal concept man, it was perceived that artificial
legal persons could be created.2' This is the basis for the modern
corporation, so important today in accumulating the vast capital
needed in modern economic enterprise.
Most important of all, here was the basis for the institutions of
private property and free contract as the means of distributing the
decision-making about the allocation and use of the natural resources
of a society. Each person who has met the requirements to be recog-
nized as the "owner" of property has the right to make the decisions
about the use to which that property will be put. He uses it by con-
tracting with others who have other property, or their own personal
skills or labor. This method of distributing decision-making makes no
sense at all unless man generally-any who may acquire property by
this indiscriminant method-can be expected to make decisions about
his piece of the resources that in the long run will be wise from the
standpoint of the community as well as from the standpoint of per-
sonal gain. Society cannot allow a man with no access to the gods to
control a grain field if a god controls the productivity of that field.
Society can allow a man who can learn about soil treatment and grain
fertility to control a grain field if these matters affect the production
of grain (and if the operation of the market will induce him to pro-
duce).
Naturally, the legal and political implementation of these basic ideas
has had many ups and downs and curious twists of interpretation. One
of the most ironical was the immediate result for public law in Rome.
The people prevailed over the patricians in the Senate.25 But recogni-
tion of the authority of the people to govern was little more than a
formality. The Emperors seldom conducted themselves as representa-
tives. Any legal and political consequences of the rational faculty in
man were subordinated for centuries to the official reason and revela-
tion of the Church; and then of Kings. The rational approach has pre-
vailed in periods when new institutions and political values were being
created, such as the time of the creation of the modern nation-states.
The analytic approach has prevailed in periods of comparative social
calm, as in England in the last century, and has made institutions
more efficient and law less confusing and contradictory. The socio-
logical approach has prevailed in periods when social change has out-
run legal and political institutions, and it has secured reinterpretation
of established principles in the light of their current social result, as
in England and the United States after the industrial revolution. But,
underlying all, Western law and politics still assume a rational uni-
24. Id. at 195-203.
25. Mellwain, op. cit. supra note 2, at ch. 3.
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verse and rational men trying to make their way about in it.2 The
conceptions of Greek natural philosophy provided the ideas for the
basic legal institutions of private property, contract, rights in the per-
son, and the right to have social institutions act to protect these
rights; and also, for the basic political institutions of representative
government and of constitutionally limited government.
II. THE INFLUENCE UPON ATTITUDES
Northrop has called attention to the universalness, the absoluteness
and the determinateness of the legal and political norms engendered
by the type of concepts that Greek natural philosophy produced. He
has pointed out that, because of these attributes in its norms, Western
society expects, demands, and uses police power to get a high degree
of explicitness of behavior. He has pointed out that what the West
would approve as "sticking up for one's rights," would be regarded in
Asian societies as "trouble-making"; and that some of the actions
which the West would approve as "law enforcement," (especially in
the international sphere), would be viewed by members of Asian so-
cieties as unjustified resort to armed force which will not help to settle
disputes. 7
I would agree completely with this characterization of Western legal
and political norms. And there can be no question that such attitudes
are generally held in the West. I believe, further, that the attitude of
"sticking up for one's rights" is a likely and probably necessary result
of the nature of the system of knowing from which the norms stem.
Greek science examined objects as discrete entities having predicates
of their own. This carried over into legal and political norms in the
form of individual legal and political rights. Legal machinery for the
protection of these rights is provided, but the machinery must be ac-
tivated by complaint of an injured party. Justice will not be done if
the injured person does not set the machinery in motion. This is to a
considerable extent true even with respect to criminal justice because
of the vital importance of the evidence given by the "complaining wit-
ness" (the victim of the criminal act). "Sticking up for one's right"
26. In McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (1932), the
author takes the rational nature of man as the main thread of the history of
Western political thought. In his introductory paragraph he says:
Dominion if it is to be justified at all must be "a condition of rational
nature" as Wycliffe defined it, and in reason permanent government must
have a justification sufficient to explain the historical fact of its contin-
uous existence among rational beings.... [W]here does "rational nature"
require that the dominant power be lodged .... [Hlow does this "ra-
tional nature" prescribe that this power shall be exercised, wherever
]edged? Id. at 1-2.
27. Northrop, The Taming of the Nations chs. 2, 3, 7, 10 (1954).
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is, therefore, necessary to the successful operation of a Western so-
ciety.
I want to suggest, however, that resort to force in the cause of
justice is, in certain instances, not justified by the nature of Western
norms and way of knowing. I believe that to some extent the attitude
of approving resort to force for justice is a holdover from the view of
life held prior to Greek science. This would seem to be an area of
study in which significance more easily becomes apparent by compari-
son. I will, therefore, compare the early thought in the West with
thought about the same questions in ancient China.
The very early lover of wisdom observed (as would a truly naive ob-
server today) a sensed world of movement, changing colors, alternat-
ing periods of light and more or less absence of light, revolving sea-
sons, opposition, communion, reproduction, growth, death. Some vital
power must animate and order this activity. To know the source and
nature of this power could mean the difference between survival and
death. The early inhabitants of the valleys of the Tigris, Euphrates,
and Nile rivers, and the shores of the Aegean sea, generally ascribed as
anthropomorphic source to this animating and ordering power.28 The
early Chinese generally did not.28
It is fascinating to speculate on why the early peoples in these two
regions accepted different answers to this basic question, but the an-
swer remains inconclusive. Possibly the geographical and ecological
environment focused attention on different factors in experience.
Chiang Yee says that China developed its civilization in the interior,
under relatively easy conditions, which allowed isolated small groups
to meet subsistence requirements, did not place a particular emphasis
upon the unusually capable man, or create a need for close cooperation
to meet the rigors of sea voyages and coastal storms. By contrast, he
says that "sea-civilizations" were created in Egypt and Greece.30 On
the other hand, Toynbee says the challenges of geography and ecology
were the same in the two areas. He says the "Egyptiac and Sumeric
and Sinic civilizations were responses to the challenges of drought and
flood and swamp and thicket... ."3 Maspero takes a middle position,
saying that despite the similar fluvial orientation the "tvo worlds"
were "entirely different," "the soil, the climate, the flora, the fauna
have nothing in common."'32
28. 3 Westrup op. cit. supra. note 5, at 216-17; Myres, The Background of
Greek Science, 16 U. Calif. Chronicle 396 (1914).
29. Chiang, The Philosophical Basis of Chinese Painting, in Ideological Differ-
ences and World Order 35 (Northrop ed. 1949); Dickinson, An Essay on the
Civilizations of India, China and Japan 46 (1914).
S0. Chiang, op. cit. supra note 29, at 36.
31. 1 Toynbee, A Study of History 321 (1934).
32. Maspero, La Chine Antique 8 (1927).
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Whatever the reason for the difference, the fact of the difference
had remarkable consequences-certainly upon attitudes toward hu-
man actions, and probably upon the development of systems of know-
ing and consequent social norms. The anthropomorphic interpreta-
tion of the animating and ordering power directed thought to (1) men
as semi-autonomous entities, and (2) control of physical events. The
non-anthropomorphic interpretation resulted in a system of knowing
in which (1) man is merely one attribute of the only entity, the uni-
verse, and (2) attention is directed to preserving and promoting the
natural harmony of the universe.
The personalizing of the animating and ordering power is seen in
the concepts of the Roman genius, the Greek daimon, the Persian
fracashi, and the Egyptian ka.- Certain resourceful, powerful, prac-
tically wise men were thought to be filled with the animating and
ordering power to a higher degree than others. When such a "demi-
god" died, it was conceived, his soul lived on as a companion and pro-
tector to his descendants. Such a man was the founder of a family.
He was the Greek eponymous hero, the Roman original paterfamilias.
The hearth fire was the symbol of the continued presence of his living
soul, and it burned upon "the hearth, the seat of the household gods,
under the foundation stone of which the house-father had once been
buried. ' " Not only did the genius of the original house-father remain
near his grave to assist, guard and guide those who supplicated it
properly, but also his active power, or mana, was passed through the
continuity of generations.35 When the peoples ascribed personalized
gods to natural events, these became family manes, and were as local
and exclusive as the founding house-father, or eponymous hero.36
The beliefs just recited were the basis for the way of life and the
legal and political norms of the early city-states described in Part I
of this paper. At the moment we are interested in their influence upon
the system of knowing developed by the Greeks, and upon attitudes
toward the use of force for justice. But first, because we are compar-
ing, we must look at the corresponding beliefs in early China.3 7 If
33. 3 Westrup, op. cit. supra note 5. at 216-17.
34. Id. at 219.
35. 2 Plato, op. cit. supra note 4.
36. Fustel, op. cit. supra note 3, at 162-63; Greenidge, op. cit. supra note 7;
Nilsson, op. cit. supra note 6, at 10.
37. This is an uncertain enterprise because the Chinese system of knowing did
not give rise to the kind of logical analysis produced by the Greek system of
knowing. Accordingly, ancient records must be interpreted in the light of the
Chinese concepts that analysis shows were implicit in early Chinese thought be-
fore valid comparison can be made with early Western conceptions. Marcel Granet
has attempted such an analytical statement of Chinese concepts in his La Pensee
Chinoise (1934). It is not possible, of course, for one who is not a sinologist to
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Granet is correct about early life and thought in China, it would ap-
pear that the most significant fact of experience for the Chinese was
the feeling of oneness with the universe experienced at the festivals
and hierogamies. This seemed to contain the efficacy that produced the
different orders of life for men and women which alternated with the
periods of communion at the festivals and hierogamies, and cor-
responded with the rhythm of the seasons.38 Time and space were im-
mediately apprehended, yet were public (or, more accurately, social,
because it was a group experience) and also normative. Time was
composed of bits of the universal order of comportments that occurred
in the proper sequence. Space was composed of bits of the universal
order of comportments that occurred in the right geometrical distribu-
tion with respect to each other. Time was weak or strong depending
upon whether or not it was composed of bits of comportment that re-
stored the sensed experience of universal solidarity. "Duration is truly
itself, entire and dense, only at occasions enriched by life in common
which mark illustrious events and seem to establish time.' 3 1 The festi-
vals and hierogamies restored the vitality of time, renewed the rhythm
of the universe. Space was full or diluted depending upon whether the
correct distribution of comportments occurred within it. Beyond the
area of the civilizing influence of the proper order of comportments
there existed only an "uncultivated space which supports only some
imperfect beings.' 40 Space and time, it will be noticed, contained not
just the comportments, but the proper order (sequence or distribu-
tion) of those comportments. "Time and space are always imagined
as an ensemble of groupings, concrete and diverse, of sites and occa-
sions" where and when it is proper for comportments to occur.41
The concepts of time and space show quite clearly that the source of
the animating and ordering power was believed to be either in the
sites and occasions where and when the universal oneness was experi-
enced, or else in the total order that was only partially immanent in
these particular events. The main stream of Chinese civilization has
always centered attention on the social and the immediate, not upon
withdrawing from this world in order to experience the timeless.
Therefore the latter is ruled out and makes it quite probable that the
make definitive judgment as to the success of Granet's attempt. However, a strong
inference that he is mainly correct can be drawn from the fact that if he is cor-
rect then many aspects of traditional Chinese society are seen as sensible implica-
tions of basic beliefs, whereas if he is not correct these aspects are inexplicable or
are explained away as mystical foolishness-as many modern investigators, both
Western and Chinese, have done.
38. Granet, op. cit. supra note 37, bk. 2.
39. Id. at 107.
40. Id. at 92.
41. Id. at 89.
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Chinese thought of the sites and occasions when universal oneness was
experienced as the source of the animation and order in the universe.
We are now in a position to compare the answers of early Greek
natural philosophy with the implicit answers of early Chinese thought
to certain basic questions:
QUESTION GREEK FOUNDATIONS EARLY CHINA
OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION
What iR Real? The Real is Stuff The Real is Social.
(Material).
Is it one oi many? A sensed one. A sensed one.
Divided or undivided? Divided.4 : Undivided.43
These answers were to a great extent presaged by the differing an-
swers given to the question of the source of the animating and order-
ing power. The answer that "Real is Stuff" is likely among a people
whose attention is directed to controlling their environment. The an-
swer that "Real is Social" is likely among a people whose attention is
directed to the collective experience of sensed universal oneness. The
answer that the Real is divided is almost necessary among a people
who believe that the animating and ordering power over Stuff is pres-
ent in high degree in particular men. The answer that the Real is
undivided is quite likely among a people who have a liturgical, social
theory of time and space.
In turn these answers to a very great extent presage the differences
between Western civilization and Chinese civilization. When the Real
is believed to be properly ordered comportments, thought is likely to
be concentrated more on "categories of relationship than on categories
of substance."" Most important of all, when the Real is believed to be
undivided, lovers of wisdom are not driven by contradiction, as the
philosophers of the West were, to posit objects other than sensed ob-
jects, or to examine objects as discrete entities with attributes of their
own. If Stuff is a one and divided, the question arises whether it is in-
finitely divisable. Logically it should be. But Zeno's paradox shows
this to be impossible. If points have extension, an infinite number of
them could not be contained in a finite line. If they do not have exten-
sion an infinite number could not compose any line at all. But when it
was said that the Real is a material sensed many, the contradiction of
incommensurable magnitudes arose. If there are indivisibles with
magnitude, and numbers refer to such objects, then every line must
42. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy 10-11 (1892).
43. Granet, op. cit. supra note 37, at 147-48.
44. Hughes, Epistemological Methods in Chinese Philosophy, in Essays in East-
West Philosophy 57 (Moore ed. 1951).
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be composed of some whole number. Yet, it was discovered that the
hypotenuses of certain right triangles cannot be expressed as whole
numbers. Democritus proposed to avoid this contradiction by putting
the incommensurability in the sensed world and positing a real world,
known rationally, which contained the indivisibles with magnitude.
Although this particular solution was soon rejected in favor of Plato's
solution which accounted for arithmetic incommensurables within the
real world, yet the use of postulated objects has remained as a unique
feature of Western science.45
Because the Chinese never held that the Real is divided, they never
met the contradictions. There is evidence that they were aware of the
right triangles whose hypotenuses bothered the Greeks, though the
date is questionable.46 Far from being a bothersome contradiction,
however, these triangles were used by the Chinese in an ingenious
demonstration of the way in which the actual dimensions of the uni-
verse were adjusted to the unchanging normative dimensions, by the
dimension of the Emperor used as a gnomon.47 The Chinese investi-
tion of nature that was developed on this base was brilliant for its
time. In fact it was surpassed in the West only yesterday.48 Its method
was acute investigation of relationships between objects. I believe
that Northrop is right in his characterization of the concepts of this
system of knowing as being confined to the immediately sensed, 40 so
far as objects are concerned. However, I am convinced by a thorough
study of Granet's account of the basic concepts of this system of know-
ing that relationships that had not been observed were postulated (in
rather crude ways, such as tables or correspondences, or the play of
numbers representing categories of related objects) and that the use-
fulness of relationships so discovered was a form of verification.60
The limitation on this way of knowing is strong evidence in support
of Northrop that the Chinese never went behind sensed objects to
postulated objects. All of the early discoveries made by the Chinesea1
-and which have occasioned much speculation as to why modern
science did not develop in China-will be found to be based on rela-
tionships between objects, or combinations of objects observable by
the senses. The limitation of this type of system, and the contrast be-
tween it and Western science with its postulation of objects and rela-
45. Burnet, op. cit. supra note 42.
46. Granet, op. cit. supra note 37, at 261-62.
47. Id. at 263-67.
48. Needham, Science and Society in Ancient China, Conway Memorial Lecture
(1947) (pamphlet).
49. Northrop, The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western
Scientific Philosophy, in Philosophy East and West 168 (Moore ed. 1946).
50. Granet, op. cit. supra note 37, especially bks. 2, 3.
51. 2 Needham, Science and Civilization in China 327 (1954-56).
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tionships, is striking in the case of gunpowder. Gunpowder is a
mechanical mixture of saltpeter, charcoal, and sulphur. By crude ex-
perimentation or accident one could discover gunpowder by dealing
only with the proper comportments (proper ways, or tao) of sensed
objects. The improved smokeless powder, or guncotton, of the West
is another matter. Guncotton is "a series of cellulose nitrates, the
highest and most explosive member of which may be represented by
the formula CI2HIO (NO,)," '- Guncotten is a chemical compound,
which can be fully understood only by knowing the tao of postulated
objects behind the sensed objects.
We are now in a position to see the causes of the characteristic atti-
tudes toward law and politics in the West and in China. From the
earliest beginnings of Western civilization a central purpose of society
has been power. All authority was put in the hands of the house-
fathers because they had the active power of the original house-fa-
thers and had access to the gods who controlled physical events. When
the universe and men became rational, the central problems of law and
politics became, and remain, the just distribution of power and the
effective maintenance of that distribution by corrective justice, as
Aristotle foresaw.53 The central purpose of Chinese society was the
establishment and maintenance of universal harmony. Law and poli-
tics as separate pursuits or disciplines were little developed because
the affairs of man did not receive a sharp focus of attention. Human
activities ought to harmonize with the universal order of comport-
ments. The river has its tao, the same as a man.
The desire to accomplish these central purposes naturally fostered
the development of attitudes calculated to aid that accomplishment.
In China actions that violated norms were wrong because they dis-
rupted the harmony of the universe. Injury caused others by such
actions was not of primary concern. Therefore, the area that the West
calls private law was almost non-existent. The injured person who de-
manded compensation and took the wrong-doer to court to get it would
only be further disrupting the harmony that ought to prevail-espe-
cially if close relatives were involved, such as brothers. John C. H. Wu
reports, as typical of law in traditional China, the case of the neigh-
bors who brought to court a dispute over the ownership of a chicken.
The magistrate asked each party what the chicken had been fed that
morning. One said beans, the other rice. Whereupon the magistrate
ordered the chicken killed, and his stomach opened. There were beans
in the stomach. The man who had said rice was punished24 The fact
that the proper Chinese way would have been peaceful mediation and
52. Webster, New International Dictionary (Ist ed. 1909).
53. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (Chase transl. 1911).
54. Wu, The Art of Law 50 (1936).
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compromise does not mean there should have been compromise as to
the norms of ownership. It was simply that a second disruption of
community harmony would not restore the harmony lost by the first
disruption. Not only should the harmony of human relationships be
maintained, but also the harmony of human activities with events of
nature. Severe punishments, especially death sentences, were not car-
ried out in the spring, when life is awakening. They were carried out
in the fall, when nature is causing "the decline and the arrest of the
forces of life."' 55
In the West the just distribution of power is disrupted by actions
that injure others. Since it is a primary purpose of law and politics
to maintain this just distribution, the injury suffered by the victims
of the wrong-doing is of primary concern in Western society. The
logical corrective action is to restore the just distribution as nearly as
possible. This is done by requiring the wrong-doer to compensate his
victim in damages, or to return what he has taken, or to do certain
acts that will stop or repair the injury. Because action by the society
to correct the injustices must be initiated by the injured person, and
because that correction is a primary purpose of the society, it is essen-
tial that an attitude of demanding justice, of "sticking up for one's
rights," should prevail. Because a misuse of power has caused the in-
jury, it is socially necessary, and appropriate, that the organized
power of the society should be brought to bear upon the wrong-doer
to enforce the judicial decision and compel him to correct the injustice.
Therefore, an attitude of approval of the use of force for corrective
justice is necessary to the successful operation of Western type legal
and political norms. Indeed, it is the application of the organized
power of the community to compel compliance with the explicit, public
casuistry embodied in the legal norms that has produced man's best
protection against the arbitrary use of power.
The use of force in support of distributive justice is another matter.
In this area are the many difficult problems generally referred to un-
der the rubrics of minority problems, and revolution. When force is
used in support of distributive justice, the purpose is to coerce com-
pliance with norms held by those persons whose organized power is
used. But the persons coerced are not willing, as a matter of principle,
to accept those norms. This is radically different from the use of force
against persons who are not principled dissidents, but wrong-doers for
selfish purposes.
I find nothing in the nature of the concepts resulting from Greek
science that would support approval of the use of force to settle a
dispute over which system of norms will be used to organize a society.
55. Escarra, Le Droit Chinois 11-12 (1936).
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I do find in the older tradition of the West support for such an atti-
tude. If personal possession of the power that animates and orders the
universe and access to the gods who control physical events is deter-
minative of who is entitled to have authority, then success in battle
proves the right to prevail, and not just the power to do so. Approval
of the use of force to settle disputes over distributive justice is an atti-
tude appropriate to the earliest stage of Western civilization. It is in-
appropriate in a mature stage, when the premises that fostered it have
been long since rejected. A change in this attitude is urgently needed
at the present time because of two facts of central importance to this
and possibly to succeeding generations.
Fact One: The instruments of force have become so efficient that
settlement of distributive justice disputes by force might possibly be
suicidal for mankind.
Fact Two: The serious disputes among states in the international
community are now disputes about distributive justice. In the previ-
ous three centuries, the community of Christian, European states had
a large measure of consensus on the norms of the international com-
munity. Enforcement machinery was decentralized, consisting of
diplomatic actions, measures short of war, and war, by blocs of states.
But there was an accepted system of distributive justice and the
wrong-doing state's power to resist was affected by the wrong-in
terms of its own will to fight and in terms of whether it could attract
allies to its defense. There were legal principles and rules that had
limited but real effect. Revolutionary, international communism, how-
ever, is a challenge to the system of distributive justice within the
international community, as well as within every state. In such a dis-
pute no common norms inhibit the motivation of moral conviction. The
struggle is "total," and it cannot be allowed to take the physical form
of total war because the possible consequences are unacceptable. Yet
one of the most deepset attitudes of the peoples of Western civilization
is to resort to physical force in such a situation.
The attitude of approving resort to force to settle disputes about
distributive justice must be changed if mankind is to survive. To say
this is not to say that force should never be used in international
disputes about distributive justice. We are in a historical situation
partly shaped by the attitude under examination. Positions have been
taken, commitments have been made, preparations have been under-
taken, present understanding retains this attitudinal focus. This his-
torical situation cannot be changed overnight. But the attitude that
the use of force may be necessary is importantly different from the
attitude that the use of force is good. The latter has a tendency to in-
duce the viewpoint that force is the only way to settle such disputes,
and to block awareness of alternative courses of action.
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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION 1: Are you saying that surrender to aggressive revolu-
tionaries is better than using military force to stop them?
ANSWER: No, I am not saying that. I would say that no state or
power bloc has the right to impose its wishes about the structure of the
emerging world community by the use of force. Therefore, so long as
any danger exists that some state or power bloc might attempt to do
this, enough force must be kept in readiness to prevent it. However,
absent dictatorial imposition, the structure of a community is built
out of the competition of inspiring ideals and practical proposals. Any
people that thinks too readily and too much about using force to over-
come obstacles to the realization of its expectations, makes itself less
effective in winning the cooperation of other peoples by the nobility of
its ideals and the effectiveness of its programs for solving such press-
ing problems as relieving mass misery and making human dignity a
reality for more of the earth's population. I think the West would
make itself more effective in dealing with all aspects of aggressive
international revolution by reconsidering its attitude toward the use
of forc6. The East has much to teach the West in this respect.
QUESTION 2: If the influence of philosophy on law and politics in the
West has been as you have stated here, what are the implications for
peoples with ancient cultures who have newly rewon political inde-
pendence and for new countries experiencing political independence
for the first time?
ANSWER: The great advances in production and scientific uses of
power in the past hundred years have made possible, for the first time
in human history, a world in which the great masses of mankind need
not live on the edge of starvation, disease, and early death. Until now
it was not humanly possible to produce enough to relieve mass misery.
It is becoming possible. The masses will demand that it be done.
Therefore, in the new and newly independent countries, the power
necessary to do this gigantic task will somehow be created. Arbitrary
uses of that power must be prevented if tyranny is not to curse the
accomplishment of plenty.
Western law and politics developed the method of preventing the
arbitrary use of power by legal enforcement of legally defined rights
of persons. Accumulations of power are controlled by the use of the
organized power of the society exercised through law enforcement and
judicial institutions in accordance with impartial, public rules estab-
lished by law making institutions. The method has proved effective.
The new and newly independent countries have drawn upon Western
experience in law and politics-as is evident in the constitutions writ-
ten in the past 15 years. However, one wonders whether legal and
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political ideas borrowed from the West will have the authenticity and
authority to be effective in new settings unless the philosophical ideas
from which they germinated are understood, accepted, and given em-
phasis in the community. In countries with ancient cultures, this may
involve de-emphasis or even abandonment of some traditional values.
But what are the alternatives? It seems unlikely that any traditional
values of ancient cultures will survive in modern states unless the
power generated for the great productive effort can be controlled so
that individual freedom and cultural diversity are not destroyed.
QUESTION 3: Is your characterization of Western society as power-
8ceklng accurate, or is it a reading back of recent history? It would
seent to be true of the past two or three centuries in the West, but did
the people in the early period of Western civilization think of them-
sch,es as organ;.,ing society in order to achieve the power to control
their en ,lronmnent? And is it not a distortion to speak of "distributive
justice" as being concerned only with the distribution of power? Does
not this idea include the just distribution of wealth, respect, and other
ivalues?
ANSWER: Let me say immediately that I was not seeking to set
down an accurate summary of what Western legal and political writ-
ers have said about the nature of law and politics in the West. I
wanted to confine myself to the philosophical ideas and the social
ideals that captured the imaginations of enough people so that they
were acted upon and therefore had substantial effects in Western so-
cieties. We are discussing the relation of philosophy to practical af-
fairs. For this purpose philosophical ideas are irrelevant if they have
never become the directing ideas in any society.
With this in mind, I believe there is reasonable accuracy in such
statements, for instance, as that the West generally gave an anthropo-
morphic interpretation to the animating and ordering principles or
forces and that China generally did not. This does not deny that con-
trary currents of thought existed in each instance. Of course any eval-
uation of such complex data is a matter of judgment, and judgments
of reasonable men may differ. I think that the nature and the central
importance of the auspices show that a primary purpose of earliest
Western society was to make use of the greatest power over events
that could be obtained. With the Greek classical writers the central
importance of power appears more in the discussion of human nature
than in the discussion of social organization. While Aristotle origi-
nated the concept of distributive justice and discussed it to some ex-
tent in terms of the just distribution of power among members of the
community, his primary discussion is in terms of the just distribution
of the powers of the individual person to take actions that reason
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shows him to be right. It should be remembered, too, that Aristotle
viewed Ethics and Politics as two parts of the same subject. With the
Stoics, especially, but also with Aristotle, virtue (personal and politi-
cal) comprises an element of will that executes the right actions
learned through rational knowledge of the summum bonum. Power as
a purpose of society was doubtless quiescent during the Dark and
Middle Ages. But the fundamental conceptions of human nature and
the universe that sparked Greek natural philosophy are the same ones
that sparked Western law and politics. The seeds of modern science
with its great potentialities for power over nature were planted by the
Greeks, though they lay quiescent for centuries. I believe the same
is true of Western law and politics and that a central purpose has al-
ways been-although for centuries more or less quiescent-the organi-
zation for power over natural and human events, and the development
of effective controls over the power sought to be generated. For these
reasons, then, I do not think the statement that a primary purpose of
social organization in the West has been power is beyond the limits of
inaccuracy necessarily present in any broad generalization.
As to the matter of "distributive justice" referring to the distribu-
tion of other values than power, let me just say that from the legal and
political point of view the important thing is always whether persons
do actually receive, use and enjoy the goods that they have a right to
receive, or whether someone who has the power to interfere-but
no right to interfere-prevents that reception, use or enjoyment. In
this sense, all law and politics is concerned with using power to keep
power within the boundaries of justice.
QUESTION 4: We have heard much of dichotomies-the West is
rational, the East is not rational; Western norms are universal, East-
ern norms are particular. Is there really such a sharp contrast be-
tween traditional Chinese law and Western law?
ANSWER: I believe there are fundamental differences between tra-
ditional law and Western law and that these differences stem from
differences in fundamental conceptions accepted in the two instances.
I am not, however, asserting such a sharp dichotomy as the question
poses. I do not agree with Dr. Northrop that the norms of Chinese
law were arrived at by mediation. Chinese ethics were highly devel-
oped, and their norms were taught in the home and in the school. The
correct way for the son to act toward his father in a given situation
was the correct way for all sons to act with respect to all fathers. If
the son did not act in the way prescribed by the norm he violated the
norm. Everyone knew the norm and recognized the violation. The
mediation that followed was concerned with what should be done
about the violation; it was not concerned with establishing the norm
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for action of this son toward this father in this situation. Therefore,
the norms were not mediational. They had universalness and absolute-
ness within the categories to which they applied. Mediation occurred
after violation because universal harmony would be disrupted a second
time if litigation were resorted to. Dr. Wu has stated the same thing
a little differently in saying that China had a system of duties, but not
a system of rights. The father did not have a right to compel his son
to obey the norm, but the son had the duty to obey the norm. There-
fore, the norm was established prior to a behavior situation between
a particular son and a particular father.
QUESTION 5: Is Western law as rational as you suggest? IsWt the
human clement present at all?
ANSWER: I think the human element operates at two stages in the
legal and political process. The first stage is in the adoption of legal
and political norms. I do not believe that the relation between philo-
sophical ideas and legal or political norms is a logical relation, that the
latter are deduced from the former. I believe that in a crisis situation,
when things have got so bad that change has become acceptable, and
someone gets the notion that a philosophical idea (which he may dis-
tort, or be only vaguely familiar with) implies or requires some new
social organization or action, and the apathy for the old together with
the asserted authority of the new result in its acceptance, that then a
social result of a philosophical idea is born. Later, as trained persons
study the philosophical idea and reach more carefully reasoned con-
clusions about its social implications, corrections in the social result
may be made if the society has provided institutions through which
community wisdom of this sort can be utilized. In this way a society,
over a period of time, can be reorganized according to a radically dif-
ferent, technically complex system of knowing, although scholars who
know the virtue of the new could never get the support of revolution-
ary masses, and revolutionary leaders could never fathom epistemol-
ogy.
The other stage at which the human element operates in the legal
and political process is in the application of legal and political norms
to the affairs of daily life. In a practical sense, all law is made by hu-
mans and applied by humans. (Even "revealed" law is revealed to
humans, to the best of my knowledge.) Therefore, the qualities of
goodness, mercy, honesty, love, and devotion to duty that make hu-
mans better humans will make judges better judges and lawyers bet-
ter lawyers. The knowledge of human fallibility is a constant amelio-
rator of the rational rigor of the law. Further, I believe that in West-
ern society, or in any society, men are only rational when they have
to be. A lawyer argues his case step by logical step to the judges of
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the appellate court, who are trained to examine matters in this way.
But the great trial lawyers talk to the jury in a seemingly rambling,
disconnected way, telling anecdotes, drawing homely analogies, quot-
ing the Bible and Shakespeare. They know that the average man is
not accustomed to thinking in a logical, connected way.
There is a much more serious aspect to man's reluctance to be ra-
tional. I believe that legal and political norms are more often limits
than initiating guides to the actions of men. I mean by this that the
average man never thinks about the law as long as he is "doing all
right" and is not made too uncomfortable about it. When injured per-
sons or his conscience raise obstacles he has to consciously decide
whether to continue that course of action or take up another one. Then
his own higher good, and the common good, as well as gain, may be-
come factors in the decision. The decision will be affected by qualities
of his character, by the pressure brought upon him by persons gaining
or losing by his actions, and by persons whose only interest is in see-
ing that the norms of the society are obeyed. It is the task of this
latter group, the "forces for law and order," to hold the balance and
keep society from disintegrating into the chaos of unlimited struggle
for selfish gain. This disinterested group can rally and prevail only
when there is consensus as to the justice of the community's norms.
And it often seems that the brink of chaos must be approached before
enough persons will rise to perform this civic duty. Little Rock is a
recent example. Law and order have to be preserved from day to day
by enough persons rising above personal gain and convenience to act
or support action in accordance with the common good as rationally
discovered and culturally transmitted.
QUESTION 6: Why do you say that the common good is rationally
discovered? One need not go through a process of reasoning to know
that it is bad when large numbers of persons in industrial slums are
starving because their wages are too low, or to know that legislation
requiring minimum wages is good. What one needs is to care, not to
know.
ANSWER: Certainly one needs to care, but the community needs also
to have possible alternative actions related to accepted fundamental
principles in order to preserve other values in the community. This
is another instance of the way in which legal and political norms act
as limits, and not as initiating guides to community action. In exactly
the situation referred to, starvation wages and miserable working con-
ditions in the wake of the industrial revolution, the Supreme Court of
the United States required that minimum wage and maximum hour
laws be proved to have a real effect in protecting the health and wel-
fare of workers and that the need for such protection was great. Only
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss2/1
INFLUENCE OF PHILOSOPHY
when it was convinced that these two facts were proven did the Su-
preme Court hold wage and hour laws valid. Until then the Court
had held these laws an unconstitutional abridgment of the funda-
mental right of free contract.* Maximum hour laws for women were
held constitutional in 1908 in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412. lini-
mum wage laws, which the Court considered a more direct interfer-
ence with the contract relation between employer and employee, were
not held constitutional until 1937, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U. S. 379.
It may be objected that the only purpose served by the Supreme
Court's rational scrutiny of the proposed legislation was to delay
remedial action and let many people suffer in the meantime. To an-
swer this objection one must call attention to the potentialities of the
alternative-no responsible weighing of proposed action against au-
thoritative first principles. English legal and political history provides
an instructive instance. In the first half of the 17th century the Eng-
lish kings used their royal prerogative to prevent many injustices that
would otherwise have resulted from the operation of the strict rules of
the common law. For instance, a man ousted from his land could not
plead in an action at law that the title had been got from him by
fraud, so he lost it to a defrauder. But, sitting in equity, and acting on
natural justice, the Chancellor would order the defrauder in the King's
name not to prevent the rightful owner from retaking and using his
land on penalty of fine or imprisonment. There was a great growth
of equity in this period, with great benefit to the people. However, a
moment's reflection will lead to the realization that the first half of
the 17th century was also the period of the infamous Star Chamber in
England. The kings asserted that their prerogative could override the
common law. They used it to do great good. They used it to do great
evil. The English decided by revolution that they would rather have
limited power in the monarchy.
* If it be questioned whether the principle of free contract was rationally dis-
covered in the first place, I would say it was in the round-about way outlined in
the first part of my answer to Question 5.
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